"Admiral Hipper" - German heavy cruiser. Heavy cruiser Displacement of a heavy cruiser

Cruiser (Dutch kruiser from kruisen - to cruise, sail along a specific route; plural cruisers or cruisers) - a class of surface combat ships capable of performing tasks independently of the main fleet, which may include fighting enemy light fleet forces and merchant ships , defense of formations of warships and convoys of ships, fire support of coastal flanks ground forces and ensuring the landing of amphibious assault forces, laying minefields and others.

Since the second half of the 20th century, the trend towards consolidation of combat formations to provide protection from enemy aircraft and the specialization of ships to perform specific tasks has led to the virtual disappearance of general purpose ships, such as cruisers, from the fleets of many countries. Only Russian, US and Peruvian navies use them currently.

Until the end of the 1950s. cruisers were the most developed and relatively numerous class of ships. Their main strength has always been artillery. The creation of missile weapons expanded the tasks facing cruisers. Many cruisers of most countries of the MPR have undergone serious modernization. Instead of guns, they received missile systems, modern radio-electronic and hydroacoustic equipment. Thus a new type of cruiser appeared - missile cruisers, which began to serve side by side with artillery cruisers.

Project 68-bis artillery cruiser, according to NATO classification - Sverdlov class

Gun cruisers are divided into heavy and light - depending on the caliber of the main artillery. The era of these ships is gradually becoming a thing of the past. Since the early 1960s. not a single new artillery cruiser was launched, and those that exist are all in reserve. Missile cruisers, or guided missile cruisers, are also divided into heavy and light, but depending on their displacement.
Typically, cruisers with a displacement of 15,000-28,000 tons are classified as heavy, and ships with a displacement of 5,000-12,000 tons are classified as light. The main task of guided missile cruisers is combat protection of large groups of ships, including aircraft carrier formations. Depending on their weapons, missile cruisers can successfully fight enemy submarines, surface ships and aircraft.

Typical URO cruisers steel American ships of the Lehi and Welknap type built in the 1960s. They have a displacement of 7800-7900 tons and a maximum speed of 32 knots. Their armament consists of two launchers of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, two twin launchers of Terrier anti-aircraft missiles and an Asrok anti-submarine complex.

A special place among surface ships is occupied by nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers. The first American cruiser of this type, Long Beach, with a displacement of 17,100 tons, entered service back in 1961. Application nuclear reactor lifted restrictions on cruising range and allowed superstructures to be designed in a new way.
"Long Veach" is a cruiser that has no armor, but it is literally stuffed with all kinds of electronics that allow it to detect the enemy from many kilometers away. However, despite a number of undoubted advantages, the Americans intend to abandon the further construction of ships of this type due to their high cost and complexity.

Further development nuclear cruisers The URO resulted in the creation of the ships Bainbridge (displacement 8590 tons) and Trakstan (9200 tons). These vessels have the same design of bow and stern ends, an extended forecastle and a high freeboard, which reduces the ship's flooding. For better protection against weapons of mass destruction, most deck mechanisms and devices are stowed below deck and inside superstructures.

In the mid-1970s. The same-type nuclear-powered missile cruisers California and South Carolina entered service. Their total displacement is 11,000 tons, and their maximum speed is 36 knots. From 1976 to 1980, the US Navy included the Virginia-class nuclear-powered cruisers, similar in appearance and characteristics to the California-class cruisers.

The missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay and the Skorsky MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter. 2008

In 1983, the new cruiser URO Ticonderoga (displacement 9600 tons) was launched - the lead ship in a series of 26 units. Power plant with a capacity of 80,000 liters. With. provides a full speed of 30 knots. A special feature of the Ticonderoga is its unusual deck covering with lightweight honeycomb panels made of non-combustible materials.
The cruiser has powerful weapons: a new Aegis anti-aircraft complex, two launchers of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a pair of installations for Standard anti-aircraft missiles and Asrok anti-submarine missiles, artillery of two 127 mm and two 20 mm guns, and also two three-tube torpedo tubes. This long list is completed by a pair of anti-submarine helicopters. Such an abundance of weapons led to the cruiser being overloaded, which is why the speed and stability of the vessel leave much to be desired. Despite this, by the mid-1990s. Another 25 such ships entered service, with the last 17 armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The strongest strike weapons (16 Basalt anti-ship missiles, 104 Fort and Osa anti-aircraft missiles) are carried on board Russian Slava-class cruisers, which is why they were even dubbed “aircraft carrier killers.” The last of them - "Chervona Ukraine" - replenished Pacific Fleet in February 1990. Not on Slava nuclear energy: It is replaced by a conventional gas turbine unit. The only nuclear-powered ships in the Russian Navy are heavy cruisers of the Kirov class (displacement 25,860 tons, length 250.1 m, speed up to 32 knots), the last of which, Petr Velikiy, was launched in 1989.

The high state of German technology and engineering simply did not allow the creation of a clearly unsuccessful project, although in the case of cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class one can partly say that such an attempt was made. In general, comparing warships of different nations, built in accordance with different strategic and tactical ideas, is a thankless task. This is especially true during the Second World War, when there was a transition of priority from factors associated with purely artillery combat (the number and quality of guns, armor) to “instrumental” elements, such as fire control systems, radars, sonars and other high-tech equipment. However, we will try to give overall assessment German version of the heavy cruiser.

First of all, it is worth noting that despite the virtual absence of displacement restrictions, which so greatly annoyed all other countries, the Germans failed to create either a more heavily armed or better protected ship. The Hipper's armament (eight 203mm guns) is equivalent to the "mandatory minimum" for Washington cruisers. At the same time, American ships of the same class had 9 guns, and Japanese ships had 10. Among the eight-gun heavy cruisers of the second generation, the Germans had perhaps the weakest protection. Algeri, one of the main potential opponents, had thicker waist and deck armor (110 mm + 40 mm bulkhead and 80 mm, respectively). The Italian Pola-class cruisers were even more heavily armored. The belt of the American "Wichita" - the last pre-war project, created for a limited displacement, had a thickness of 163 mm, although on a smaller area than that of the "Germans". Against this background, the 80-mm belt, reinforced by a 30-mm bevel (which provided protection approximately corresponding to 110-130 mm, taking into account the spacing of the armor and depending on the distance), did not look very impressive. Anyway, traditional principle construction of German ships - enhanced protection, even at the expense of weapons - was not observed when creating the project for heavy cruisers. Even the most powerfully armed Japanese heavy cruisers, smaller in displacement and faster, had approximately the same level of armor (102 mm inclined belt, albeit over a much smaller area). As a result, heavily protected large light cruisers armed with 12–15 six-inch guns (British “Cities” and “Colonies”, American “Brooklyns” and “Clevelands”) became dangerous opponents for the “Germans”, especially at short distances, where a large role the density of the fire played a role.

Everything that has been said about the armor of the “hippers” can also be said about their underwater protection. The boule system with a thin (20-mm) main anti-torpedo bulkhead provided no more safety than the 40-mm armored bulkhead of the Algeri with a developed double side system, or than the same boules plus the 25-mm bulkhead of Japanese heavy cruisers. However, this fact only indicates the fundamental impossibility of providing sufficient underwater protection from contemporary torpedoes to any ship of this class. Survival during underwater explosions was largely ensured by the large reserve of buoyancy of the “box” itself and the careful design and construction of all watertight bulkheads. Well, also good luck in case of a specific defeat. The break in the stern of the Eugen seems to indicate insufficient strength of the hull, but its behavior during an atomic explosion indicates the preservation of quite decent survivability even after long service in the absence of proper “care”.

Enough has already been said about the torment with the power plant. It is only worth noting that it did not provide particularly high driving characteristics. The speed of slightly more than 32.5 knots per mile is by no means a record speed. The seaworthiness of the “hippers” was satisfactory, but nothing more. For the Atlantic, the hull turned out to be a bit low; the bow end was heavily flooded with water in bad weather, even after “building up” the “Atlantic” stem.

Consistent consideration of moderate combat qualities may raise the question: where did such a significant excess displacement “evaporate”? The answer to the question can be obtained by considering the auxiliary weapons and equipment of German heavy cruisers. If their weapons do not look very impressive, then the fire control systems, perhaps, have no analogues among this class of ships. Complete duplication of the control center and computer centers of the main and anti-aircraft caliber and their equipping with optics and high-class equipment gave the “hippers” almost “battleship” capabilities. In terms of the power of heavy anti-aircraft weapons (twelve 105-mm guns), only American cruisers could compete with them starting from “ Wichita." All this took about 2,500 tons. A lot of the weight was “eaten up” by the Germans’ attempts to give their ships as much versatility as possible. Aircraft equipment, 12 torpedo tubes with spare torpedoes, supplies and stores also accounted for a significant part of the load.

This versatility and abundance of equipment led to two very important consequences from the point of view of project evaluation. Firstly, the size of the team has increased dramatically. Instead of 600–800 people on the cruisers of England, France and the USA, on the “hippers” the crew reached 1400–1600 people, and on military campaigns additional sailors were usually taken on top of the complement. Thus, heavy cruisers, like all large ships of Germany, absorbed a large number of scarce trained personnel and, at first glance, Hitler’s purely voluntaristic decision to withdraw them to the reserve after the “New Year’s battle” of 1943 made a certain sense: the crew of one ship was equal to strength to the crews of an entire flotilla of submarines.

The second consequence was the price. The Hipper and her sisterships turned out to be extremely expensive ships. There are many reasons for this, in particular - high cost work force in Germany (fascism paid well for skilled labor at military enterprises), but the high cost of high-tech weapons and equipment that heavy cruisers were equipped with also played a significant role. Their cost steadily increased: from the “Hipper” (85.9 million Reichsmarks) to the “Prinz Eugen” (104.5 million). It is enough to compare these figures with the price of “pocket battleships” (80–90 million) and real battleships of the Scharnhorst type (about 175 million) and Bismarck (180–200 million) to understand how expensive they were purchased There are not too many advantages of German heavy cruisers. Instead of two units of this class, it was theoretically possible to build an extra battleship, a ship that would be several times more useful in all respects (in terms of protection, armament, range, degree of threat to the enemy and the possibility of diverting his forces). Or have 7 “pocket battleships” instead of a 5-ship series of heavy cruisers. This option seems particularly preferable from the point of view of attempting to conduct a cruising war. But everything is overwhelmed by the comparison with the cost of submarines: according to German experts, each “hipper” is equivalent to about 25 submarines, which undoubtedly could bring much more benefits.

Even more striking is the high cost of the “Germans” in comparison with the heavy cruisers of other countries. At comparable prices, the cost of early units is over 4 million pounds sterling, and "Eugen" - almost 5 million, while the British "County" cost about 2 million pounds. The difference is further magnified when one takes into account the much higher operating costs in the case of German cruisers, associated with a huge crew and the high maintenance requirements of a capricious mechanical installation.

As a result, claims to create a “large fleet” cost the Third Reich dearly, both in terms of the monetary and human costs themselves, and in the sense of diverting them from other options for use. Heavy cruisers are perhaps the most striking illustration of this. Created to operate as part of squadrons of a single fleet similar to the Fleet Open sea, they never found their “niche” in combat use, since the most striking episodes of their activities associated with the shelling of coastal targets in the last stage of the Second World War can hardly be considered as such.

However, not all so simple. It may seem paradoxical, but despite all the negative aspects listed, the German project was largely the prototype of modern cruisers. Indeed, the Soviet Sverdlov-class cruisers built after the war are very close in layout, characteristics and equipment to the 6-inch version of the “hippers”. The British designed ships with approximately similar parameters (albeit more heavily armed) after the lifting of restrictions on displacement. The focus not on the raw power of the salvo, but on ensuring high-quality fire control, on higher versatility of combat units, has become the main trend in the further development of the class of cruisers, for which, however, history has not left much time.

Heavy cruiser "Blücher"

Heavy cruiser - This is a subclass of artillery cruisers. Their construction was carried out in 1916-1953. Until 1930, heavy cruisers were called “Washington”; however, in 1930, according to the London Naval Treaty, the term “heavy cruiser” was officially introduced to distinguish them from smaller light cruisers armed with artillery of no more than 155 mm caliber. The artillery caliber of heavy cruisers was 203 mm, and the standard displacement was 10 thousand tons, and the artillery caliber was 203 mm. In the naval weapons system, heavy cruisers occupied an intermediate place between light and battle cruisers. Heavy cruisers were actively used in World War II and formed an important part of the fleets of all leading naval powers. At the end of the war, a small number of units remained in the USA, Argentina, and Spain. In 1991, the last ships of this class were decommissioned after a long stay in reserve.

Standard "Washington" cruiser

In 1915, the British Admiralty ordered a series of cruisers to industry, having done away with the German cruiser-raiders, ordered a series of cruisers to industry, fearing new hypothetical German raiders with powerful weapons. These cruisers were supposed to surpass any promising German cruiser in all respects. Since the armament of the expected enemies was supposed to be 150-mm guns, the Admiralty wanted to see on the newest “raider fighters” the largest-caliber artillery, which would still allow manual loading, and at the same time would surpass the German 150-mm guns in firing range. As a result, the new cruisers received 190 mm guns. However, the construction of Hawkins-class cruisers was eventually delayed, and on the First world war the ships were not hit.

In 1922, at the Washington Conference on Limiting Naval Armaments, a decision was made to limit the quality characteristics of ships, including cruisers. The British did not want to part with the latest and very expensive ships, so they insisted on accepting the characteristics of the Hawkins as standard. This was greatly facilitated by the impression that the Hawkins made on the naval circles of the world. For example, the USA and Japan immediately began to develop cruisers that were at least as good as the British novelties.

As a result, the main contracting parties reacted quite favorably to the wishes of the British delegation. This is how Articles XI and XII of the Washington Treaty of 1922 appeared, which prohibited the construction of cruisers with a displacement of more than 10 thousand tons (English long tons) and with artillery larger than 203 mm. The number of newly built cruisers was not limited, but there were total restrictions on the tonnage of the fleet in the proportion: 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75, respectively, for the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Since a moratorium was declared on the construction of battleships, “cruising” fever began.

In 1962, there was a high-profile emergency on the cruiser Long Beach. During training exercises in the presence of high-ranking officials of the state, among whom was President Kennedy himself, the newest nuclear-powered missile cruiser was unable to intercept an air target. Annoyed, Kennedy inquired about the composition of the Long Beach's weapons. Having learned that the cruiser has no artillery at all (there are only 4 missile complex), he, as a former sailor, recommended adding a couple of universal-caliber guns.

So, the bold idea to build a ship with a purely rocket-powered vehicle failed. Kennedy was soon killed, and the guided-missile cruiser Long Beach has since carried two 127 mm guns on its deck. Ironically, during its 30 years of service, the cruiser never used its artillery, but regularly fired missiles. And, every time, he hit the target.

On the other side of the ocean, similar processes took place. Immediately after the death of Joseph Stalin, in 1953, the construction of heavy cruisers of Project 82 “Stalingrad” (total displacement - 43 thousand tons) was stopped. The command of the Navy, including the legendary Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, unequivocally spoke out against these ships: complex, expensive, and, by that time, already obsolete. The estimated cruising range of the Stalingrad did not exceed 5,000 miles at a 15-knot speed. In all other respects, the heavy cruiser was 10-20% inferior to its foreign counterparts; its anti-aircraft weapons raised many questions. Even the excellent 305 mm guns could not save the situation - the naval battle threatened to turn into a second Tsushima.

However, until the mid-1950s, the USSR did not have the real technical capabilities to create a powerful ocean-going nuclear missile fleet and was forced to build ships with conventional artillery and torpedo-mine weapons. In the period from 1949 to 1955, the ship composition of the USSR Navy was replenished with fourteen artillery cruisers of Project 68-bis (Sverdlov class). Initially created for defensive operations in coastal waters, these 14 ships soon turned out to be one of the few effective means of the USSR Navy for delivering paralyzing strikes against aircraft carrier strike groups of a “probable enemy.” At moments of aggravation of the international situation, the cruisers of Project 68-bis were tightly “glued” to the American AUGs, threatening at any moment to bring down hundreds of kilograms of deadly metal from their twelve 152 mm guns onto the decks of aircraft carriers. At the same time, the cruiser itself could not pay attention to the fire of 76 mm and 127 mm guns of American escort cruisers - thick armor reliably protected the crew and mechanisms from such primitive ammunition.

Cruiser "Mikhail Kutuzov" project 68 bis.
Displacement 18 thousand tons, maximum speed 35 knots, armament: 12x152 mm main caliber guns, 12x100 mm universal caliber guns, 8 AK-230 anti-aircraft guns. Armored belt - 100mm.

Among naval enthusiasts, there is an opinion that the construction of three heavy cruisers of the Stalingrad type instead of 14 68-bis could significantly enhance the potential of the USSR Navy - nine 305 mm guns of a heavy cruiser could sink an attack aircraft carrier in a few salvoes, and their firing range was several times greater exceeded the firing range of 152 mm guns. Alas, the reality turned out to be more prosaic - the cruising range of Project 68-bis cruisers reached 8,000 nautical miles at an operational and economic speed of 16-18 knots - enough to operate in any area of ​​the World Ocean (as noted earlier, the estimated cruising range of the Stalingrad was almost two times less: 5000 miles at 15 knots). Moreover, time did not allow waiting - it was necessary to saturate the USSR Navy with new ships as quickly as possible. The first 68-bis entered service already in 1952, while the construction of the Stalingrads could only be completed by the end of the 50s.

Of course, in the event of a real combat clash, 14 artillery cruisers also did not guarantee success - while tracking US Navy aircraft carrier groups over Soviet ships There was a swarm of deck-based attack aircraft and bombers, ready, at a signal, to pounce on their prey from all directions. From the experience of World War II, it is known that during an air attack on a cruiser similar in design to the 68-bis, from the moment the attack began until the moment when the ship’s masts were hidden in the waves, a time period of 8-15 minutes passed. The cruiser lost its combat capability already in the first seconds of the attack. The air defense capabilities of the 68 bis remained at the same level, and the speed jet aircraft increased significantly (the rate of climb of the piston Avenger is 4 m/s; the rate of climb of the jet Skyhawk is 40 m/s).

It would seem a completely losing situation. The optimism of the Soviet admirals was based on the fact that a single successful hit could paralyze the AUG - just remember the terrible fire on the deck of an aircraft carrier from an accidentally activated 127 mm NURS. The cruiser and its 1,270 crew will, of course, die the death of the brave, but the AUG will significantly lose its combat effectiveness.
Fortunately, all of these theories remain unconfirmed. The 68-bis cruisers appeared on the ocean in a timely manner and served honorably for 40 years in the USSR Navy and the Indonesian Navy. Even when the basis of the USSR Navy were nuclear missile submarines and space systems target designation, the old cruisers were still used as control ships, and if necessary, they could take a battalion of marines onto their decks and support the landing force with fire.

Inglourious scum

During the Cold War, NATO countries adopted an aircraft carrier concept for fleet development, which showed itself brilliantly during World War II. All main tasks, including attacks on surface and ground targets, were assigned to aircraft carriers - carrier-based aircraft could hit targets hundreds of kilometers away from the squadron, which gave sailors exceptional opportunities to control sea space. Ships of other types performed primarily escort functions or were used as anti-submarine weapons.

HMS Vanguard, 1944. One of the best battleships in terms of all its characteristics. Displacement - 50 thousand tons. The main caliber is eight 381 mm guns. Citadel belt - 343...356 mm armor steel

The big guns and thick armor of battleships had no place in the new hierarchy. In 1960, Great Britain scrapped its only battleship, the Vanguard. In the United States, relatively new battleships of the South Dakota type were withdrawn from service in 1962. The only exception was the four Iowa-class battleships, two of which managed to take part in the operation against Iraq. Over the last half century, the Iowas have periodically appeared in the sea only to disappear again after shelling the coasts of Korea, Vietnam or Lebanon, falling asleep for many years of mothballing. Did their creators see such a purpose for their ships?

The nuclear missile era changed all ideas about familiar things. Of the entire Navy, only strategic missile submarines could operate effectively in a global nuclear war. Otherwise, the navy lost its importance and was retrained to perform police functions in local wars. Aircraft carriers did not escape this fate either - over the past half century, they have firmly acquired the image of “aggressors against third world countries”, capable only of fighting the Papuans. In fact, this is a powerful naval weapon, capable of surveying 100 thousand square meters in an hour. kilometers of the ocean surface and strikes many hundreds of kilometers from the side of the ship, was created for a completely different war. But, fortunately, their capabilities remained unclaimed.

The reality turned out to be even more discouraging: while the superpowers were preparing for a global nuclear war, improving the anti-nuclear protection of ships and dismantling the last layers of armor, the number of local conflicts was growing throughout the globe. While strategic submarines hid under the ice of the Arctic, conventional destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers performed their usual functions: they provided “no-fly zones”, carried out a blockade and release of sea communications, provided fire support to ground forces, and acted as an arbiter in international disputes, by his very presence forcing the “disputants” to peace.

The culmination of these events was the Falklands War - Great Britain regained control over the islands lost in the Atlantic, 12 thousand kilometers from its shores. The decrepit, weakened empire showed that no one has the right to challenge it, thereby strengthening its international authority. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons in Great Britain, the conflict proceeded on a modern scale. sea ​​battle– with missile destroyers, tactical aircraft, conventional bombs and precision weapons. And the fleet played its key role in this war. Two British aircraft carriers, Hermes and Invincible, especially distinguished themselves. In relation to them, the word “aircraft carriers” must be put in quotation marks - both ships had limited characteristics, a small air group of vertical take-off aircraft and did not carry AWACS aircraft. But even these replicas of real aircraft carriers and two dozen subsonic Sea Harriers became a formidable obstacle to Argentine missile-carrying aircraft, preventing them from completely sinking the Royal Navy.

Atomic killer

In the mid-70s, US Navy specialists began to return to the idea of ​​a heavy cruiser capable of operating off enemy shores without the support of its own aircraft - a real ocean bandit capable of dealing with any possible enemy. This is how the project of the nuclear strike cruiser CSGN (cruiser, strike, guided missle, nuclear-powered) appeared - a large (total displacement of 18,000 tons) ship with powerful missile weapons and (attention!) large-caliber artillery. In addition, it was planned to install the Aegis system on it for the first time in the American fleet.

The armament complex of the promising CSGN cruiser was planned to include:
- 2 inclined launchers Mk.26 Ammunition - 128 anti-aircraft and anti-submarine missiles.
- 2 armored ABL launchers. Ammunition – 8 Tomahawks
- 2 launchers Mk.141 Ammunition - 8 anti-ship missiles "Harpoon"
- 203 mm highly automated 8”/55 Mk.71 gun with the awkward name MCLWG. The promising naval gun had a rate of fire of 12 rounds/min, with a maximum firing range of 29 kilometers. Installation weight – 78 tons (including a magazine for 75 rounds). Calculation – 6 people.
- 2 helicopters or VTOL aircraft

Of course, nothing like this appeared in reality. The 203 mm gun turned out to be insufficiently effective compared to the 127 mm Mk.45 gun - the accuracy and reliability of the MCLWG turned out to be unsatisfactory, while the light 22-ton Mk.45 had a 2 times higher rate of fire and, in general, there was no need for a new large-caliber artillery system was.
The CSGN cruiser was finally destroyed by the nuclear power plant - after several years of operation of the first nuclear cruisers, it became clear that the nuclear power plant, even if we do not consider the price aspect, significantly spoils the characteristics of the cruiser - a sharp increase in displacement, lower combat survivability. Modern gas turbine units easily provide a cruising range of 6-7 thousand miles at an operational and economic speed of 20 knots. - no more is required from warships (under normal conditions for the development of the Navy, ships of the Northern Fleet should not sail to Yokohama, the Pacific Fleet should sail there). Moreover, the autonomy of a cruiser is determined not only by its fuel reserves. Simple truths, they have already been said many times.

Tests of 203 mm Major Caliber Lightweight Gun

In a word, the CSGN project collapsed, giving way to missile cruisers like Ticonderoga. Among conspiracy theorists, there is an opinion that CSGN is a CIA special operation designed to direct the USSR Navy along the wrong path of building the Orlans. This is unlikely to be the case, given that all the elements of the supercruiser have one way or another become reality.

Missile dreadnought

In discussions on the forum " Military Review“The idea of ​​a highly protected missile and artillery cruiser has been repeatedly discussed. Indeed, in the absence of confrontation at sea, such a ship has a number of advantages in local wars. First, the missile dreadnought is an excellent platform for deploying hundreds of cruise missiles. Secondly, everything that is within a radius of 50 km (surface ships, fortifications on the coast) can be swept away by the fire of its 305 mm guns (twelve-inch caliber - the optimal combination of power, rate of fire and weight of the installation). Thirdly, a unique level of security, unattainable for most modern ships (only nuclear attack aircraft carriers can afford 150-200 mm armor).

The most paradoxical thing is that all these weapons (cruise missiles, systems, air defense, powerful artillery, helicopters, armor, radio electronics), according to preliminary calculations, easily fit into the hull of a Queen Elizabeth-class super-dreadnought, laid down exactly 100 years ago - in October 1912!

HMS Warspite - Queen Elizabeth class super-dreadnought, early 20th century

To accommodate 800 vertical launchers of the Mk.41 type, an area of ​​at least 750 square meters is required. m. For comparison: the two aft towers of the Queen Elizabeth main caliber occupy 1100 sq. m. The weight of 800 UVP is comparable to the weight of heavily armored two-gun turrets with 381 mm guns along with their barbettes and armored charging magazines. Instead of sixteen 152 mm medium-caliber guns, 6-8 “Kortik” or “Broadsword” anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems can be installed. The caliber of the bow artillery will be reduced to 305 mm – again a significant saving in displacement. Over the past 100 years, there have been enormous advances in power plants and automation, all of which should entail a reduction in the displacement of the "rocket dreadnought".

Of course, with such metamorphoses, the appearance of the ship, its metacentric height and load items will completely change. To bring the external shape and maintenance of the ship to normal will require long, painstaking work by an entire scientific team. But the main thing is that there is not a single fundamental prohibition against such “modernization”.
The only glaring question is what the price of such a ship will be. I offer readers an original plot twist: try to evaluate the “missile dreadnought” of the “Queen Elizabeth - 2012” class in comparison with the missile destroyer of the “Arleigh Burke” type, and we will do it not on the basis of boring exchange rates, but using data from open sources + a drop of common sense logic. The result, I promise, will be very funny.

So, Aegis destroyer of the Arleigh Burke type, subseries IIA. Total displacement – ​​approx. 10,000 tons. Weapons:
- 96 UVP Mk.41 cells
- one 127 mm Mk.45 gun
- 2 anti-aircraft self-defense systems “Phalanx”, 2 automatic guns “Bushmaster” (caliber 25 mm)
- 2 torpedo tubes of 324 mm caliber
- helipad, hangar for 2 helicopters, magazine for 40 aviation ammunition

The cost of "Arleigh Burke" is on average $1.5 billion. This colossal figure is determined by three almost equal components:
500 million – cost of the steel case.
500 million – the cost of the power plant, mechanisms and equipment of the ship.
500 million – cost of the Aegis system and weapons.

1. Body. According to preliminary estimates, the mass of the steel structures of the Arleigh Burke hull is in the range of 5.5 - 6 thousand tons.
The weight of the hull and armor of the Queen Elizabeth-class battleship is well known - 17 thousand tons. Those. requires three times more metal compared to a small destroyer. From the point of view of banal erudition and incomprehensible eternal truth, the empty box of the Queen Elizabeth hull costs as much as a modern Arleigh Burke-class destroyer - $1.5 billion. And not a penny less.
(In addition, we must take into account the reduction in the cost of building the Arleigh Burke due to large-scale construction, but this calculation does not claim to be mathematically accurate).

2. Power plant, mechanisms and equipment.
"Arleigh Burke" is set in motion 4 gas turbines LM2500 with a total power of 80 thousand hp. There are also three emergency operation gas turbine units manufactured by Allison.
The initial power of the Queen Elizabeth power plant was 75 thousand hp. - this was enough to ensure a speed of 24 knots. Of course, in modern conditions this is an unsatisfactory result - to increase maximum speed ship up to 30 knots a twice as powerful power plant will be required.
The Queen Elizabeth initially carried 250 tons of fuel - the British super-dreadnought could crawl 5,000 miles at a speed of 12 knots.
On board the destroyer Arleigh Burke there are 1,500 tons of JP-5 kerosene. This is enough to provide a range of 4,500 miles at 20 kts. on the move.
It is quite obvious that Queen Elizabeth 2012 will require twice as much fuel to maintain the characteristics of Arleigh Burke, i.e. twice as many tanks, pumps and fuel lines.
Also, a multiple increase in the size of the ship, the number of weapons and equipment on board will lead to the crew of the Queen Elizabeth 2012 increasing at least twice as much as the Arleigh Burke.
Without further ado, we will increase the initial cost of the power plant, mechanisms and equipment of the missile destroyer exactly twice - the cost of the “stuffing” of the “missile dreadnought” will be $1 billion. Does anyone still have doubts about this?

3. Aegis and weapons
The most interesting chapter. The cost of the Aegis system, including all the ship's radio-electronic systems, is $250 million. The remaining 250 million is the cost of the destroyer's weapons. As for the Aegis system of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, they have a modification with limited characteristics, for example, there are only three target illumination radars. For example, there are four of them on the cruiser Ticonderoga.

From a logical point of view, all of the Arleigh Burke's weapons can be divided into two main components: Mk.41 launch cells and other systems (artillery, anti-aircraft self-defense systems, jammers, torpedo tubes, helicopter maintenance equipment). I think it is possible to assume that both components have equal value, i.e. 250 million/2=125 million dollars - in any case, this will have little effect on the final result.
So, the cost of 96 launch cells is 125 million dollars. In the case of the “missile dreadnought” Queen Elizabeth - 2012, the number of cells increases 8 times - up to 800 UVP. Accordingly, their value will increase 8 times - up to 1 billion dollars. What are your objections to this?

Main caliber artillery. The five-inch light naval gun Mk.45 weighs 22 tons. The 12-inch Mk.8 naval gun, used on ships during World War II, weighed 55 tons. That is, even without taking into account the technological difficulties and labor intensity of production, this system requires 2.5 times more metal. For Queen Elizabeth 2012, four such guns are required.

Assistive systems. The Arleigh Burke has two Phalanxes and two Bushmasters, and the missile dreadnought has 8 much more complex Kortik missile and artillery systems. The number of SBROC launchers for shooting reflectors has increased two to three times. Aviation equipment will remain the same - 2 helicopters, a hangar and landing pad, a fuel tank and an ammunition store.

I believe it is possible to increase the initial value of this property eight times - from 125 million to 1 billion dollars.

That's probably all. I hope the reader will be able to correctly evaluate this terrible hybrid, Queen Elizabeth -2012, which is a combination of an old British ship and Russian-American weapons systems. The meaning is literally the following, from the point of view of elementary mathematics, the cost of a “missile dreadnought” with 800 UVP, armor and artillery will be at least $4.75 billion, which is comparable to the cost of a nuclear aircraft carrier. At the same time, the “missile dreadnought” will not have even a fraction of the capabilities of an aircraft-carrying ship. This is probably the reason for the refusal to build such a “wunderwaffe” in all countries of the world.

Heavy cruisers of Japan

“War at Sea” No. 26. 2005 Periodical popular science publication for members of military history clubs. Editor-compiler Ivanov S.V. With the participation of ARS LLC. License LV No. 35 dated 08.29.97 © Ivanov S. V... 2004. The publication does not contain propaganda or advertising. Printed at the Nota printing house, Beloretsk, st. Sovetskaya, 14 Circulation: 300 copies.

Introduction

The heavy cruiser "Takao" fires with its main caliber at the American battleship "South Dakota", Guadalcanal, the night of November 14-15, 1942. The cruisers "Takao" and "Atagi", the battleship "Kirishima" during the combat mission of shelling the air base of the naval corps US infantry at Henderson Field were intercepted by the American battleship South Dakota and the cruiser Washington. In the night battle, the battleship Kirishima was sunk, and the battleship South Dakota was heavily damaged.

Armored cruiser Ikoma, a Tsukuba-class ship, took part in a review of the German fleet in 1912. Around this time, Tsukuba and Ikoma were classified as battlecruisers.

At the outbreak of World War II, Japanese Imperial Navy was the third largest navy in the world, second only to the US Navy and the British Navy. As of December 1941, the Japanese fleet included 18 heavy cruisers. In general, the structure and combat composition of the fleet were more offensive than defensive in nature. Japanese heavy cruisers were big ships with exceptionally powerful artillery and torpedo weapons, high speed navigation and significant draft. Cruisers were excellent for conducting combat operations at night. Their significant size, combined with powerful power plants, will make it possible to modernize the cruisers with little cost, strengthening their torpedo and anti-aircraft artillery weapons. Distinctive features The external appearance of the cruisers became pagoda-shaped superstructure towers, by which Japanese cruisers can be easily distinguished from the cruisers of the fleet of any other country in the world. In addition to the unusual-looking superstructures, the designers also installed extremely unusual curved chimneys on the cruisers. These caressing glances naval aesthetes' ships went through the entire crucible of the war in the Pacific Ocean.

From 1880 to 1905, the Imperial Japanese Navy received armored cruisers of several classes, designed and built in Great Britain, France, Italy and even Tsarist Russia. The latter became trophies of the Russo-Japanese War and, in turn, in most cases were the result of brainstorming by French shipbuilders. From 1905 to 1911 For the Imperial Japanese Navy, two Tsukuba-class cruisers were built in Kure, and two Kurama-class cruisers were built in Yokosuka. The Kurama-class cruisers were a development of the Tsukuba-class ships, which had a number of serious disadvantages. These four cruisers were the first Japanese-built capital ships. With a displacement of 15,400 tons and armament of 12-inch guns, it is hardly possible to classify “cruisers” as a strictly defined type of ship. When the UK introduced battlecruisers with the armament of a battleship but the speed and armor of a cruiser, Japanese ships were also called battlecruisers. In 1923, they were classified as A-class cruisers. The design of Tsukuba and Kurama did not have any influence on the design of Japanese heavy cruisers that took part in World War II.

The line of development of heavy cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which took part in the Second World War, began with the experimental light cruiser Yubari, laid down on July 31, 1923. This small ship (on trials its displacement was 4091 tons, 2/3 of the full one) was sharply different in contours housings, appearance, armament and hull strength from the 55,500-ton light cruisers Nagara and Sendai. The cruiser Yubari was designed in the early 20s under the leadership of the famous shipbuilder Hiragi Yuzuri and his assistant Fuhimoto Kikuo specifically to test the concept of a high-speed ship with powerful torpedo and artillery weapons, which were combined with decent armor protection with a small displacement. A successful ship is always a compromise between the power of weapons, security and sailing speed. Violation of the compromise always leads to an imbalance of characteristics. For example, the Germans installed on their “pocket battleships” of the Deutschland class with a displacement of 11,700 tons, very powerful main-caliber artillery for their class and equipped the ships with serious armor, the price for which was a drop in full speed to 28 knots. Hiragi wanted to build a cruiser that was armed and armored significantly better than the Sendai-class light cruisers (displacement 5,595 tons). In terms of its combat capabilities, the new cruiser, at a minimum, should have been on par with the American ones. light cruisers the Omaha type with a displacement of 7,050 tons and the British O-class cruisers with a displacement of 5,780 tons. While the Yubari cruiser was being built, the conceptual design of medium cruisers with a displacement of 7,500 tons was underway, which were later reclassified as heavy. By the time the Washington Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Arms was concluded, the designers had completed the ship's drawings. These ships became known as Furutaka and Kako.

The Washington Treaty, concluded on July 3, 1922, limited the displacement of a heavy cruiser to 10,000 tons and limited the number of ships in the Navy of one country with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons. Cruisers with a displacement of 10,000 were called “Washington”. What’s interesting is that the naval arms limitation agreement provoked a “cruising race”: previously, in all countries of the world except Great Britain, no one had built cruisers of such a large displacement. The ship's displacement, according to the Washington Treaty, was determined for a ship ready to go to sea with a full crew, supplies and ammunition, but without taking into account the mass of fuel, water, and oil. It is not surprising, therefore, that almost all Washington cruisers had in practice a displacement exceeding 10,000 tons. The conclusion of the Washington Treaty forced Japan to abandon the program to build eight new battleships and eight battlecruisers. Priorities in shipbuilding have shifted towards the construction of heavy cruisers. Under the terms of the treaty, Japan could build an additional two medium cruisers and four heavy cruisers with a standard displacement of no more than 10,000 tons each.

An improved version of the Tsukuba-class cruiser, the Karuma cruiser has tripod masts, which are usually associated with dreadnought-type battleships.

The armored cruiser Ibuki, the sister ship of the lead ship in the Kurima cruiser series. These cruisers had three smokestacks, while the Tsukuba-class cruisers made do with only two smokestacks.

Fuhimoto began designing the medium cruisers that became known as the Aoba and Kinugasa, while Hiraga began to carefully analyze the design of the newest British cruisers. Initially, the designed ships resembled Furutaka-class cruisers, armed with six 203 mm guns in single-gun half-turrets, but then Fujimoto proposed installing three two-gun 203 mm caliber turrets on the cruiser in combination with a new type of aircraft catapults. Changes made to the ship's design by Fujimota. led to an increase in displacement and a decrease in stability compared to cruisers of the Furutaka type. Hiraga did not approve of increasing the weight of the cruiser, but Furatuku and Kako were later rebuilt in the image and likeness of Aoba. Fujimota's proposed compromise, along with the Japanese tradition of designing hulls of limited displacement and then "filling" them, led to constant changes to the design, many of which were aimed at reducing the mass located above the metacentric height in order to improve stability.

A unique case in the history of shipbuilding, when the personalities of two outstanding Japanese designers played such a prominent role in the upcoming battles of ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy with ships of the United Nations in World War II.

Development of Japanese heavy cruisers, profiles presented in one scale.

Yubari Class Experimental Light Cruiser Yubari, 1944

Furutaka Class Furutaka, 1941

Aoba Class Aoba, 1945

Myoko Class Myoko, 1945

Takao Class Takao, 1944

Mogami Class Suzuya, 1944

Mogami Seaplane Cruiser, 1944

Tone Class Tone, 1945

Hiraga proved himself to be a brilliant practical engineer who strived to get results without resorting to compromises. In terms of the level of his talent, Fuhimoto was not inferior to Hiraga, but more than Hiraga, he listened to the opinions of other people knowledgeable in the construction of ships and paid more attention to increasing the stability of the ships he designed.

Shortly after the signing of the Washington Treaty, the General Staff navy issued an order to Hiraga to design a new class of heavy cruiser with a displacement of 10,000 tons. Having relatively little experience in building large ships, Japan began to...